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In a recent paper [S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)], a
quantum secret sharing protocol based on reusable GHZ states was proposed. However, in this
comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure because a cheater can gain all the secret bits
before sharing, while introducing one data bit error at most in the whole communication, which
makes the cheater avoid the detection by the communication parities.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
In a recent paper [1], Bagherinezhad and Karimipour
proposed a quantum secret sharing protocol based on
reusable GHZ states as secure carriers (BK protocol).
The security against both intercept-resend strategy and
entangle-ancilla strategy was proved. Gao, Guo, Wen
and Zhu showed that Eve can obtain the data bits in
the odd rounds without being detected by the commu-
nication parties [2]. To avoid this attack, the legitimate
parties need to interspace by stray random bits in the
odd rounds [3]. However, we will show that a cheater,
called Bob, can gain all the secret bits before sharing at
the cost of one data bit error at most. Bob employs a
special attack strategy called entanglement split in one
even round, and intercept-resends the data bits with the
split entanglement in the sequel.
Let us give a brief description of the BK protocol
[1]. In the odd round, Alice, Bob and Charlie share
the carriers |G〉abc = (1/
√
2)(|000〉+ |111〉)abc. Alice en-
tangles the state |qq〉12 that denotes the data bit q to
|G〉abc by performing two CNOT gatesCa1Ca2 to produce
the state |Φodd〉 = (1/√2)(|000〉abc|qq〉12 + |111〉abc|1 +
q, 1 + q〉12)(CNOT is specified by two subscripts, the
first one is the control bit, the second is the target
bit.). In the even round, three parties share the carri-
ers |E〉abc = (1/2)(|000〉+ |110〉+ |101〉+ |011〉)abc. Alice
entangles the state |q〉12 = (1/
√
2)(|0, q〉 + |1, 1 + q〉)12
that denotes the data bit q to |E〉abc by performing one
single CNOT gate Ca1 to produce the state |Ψeven〉 =
(1/
√
2)(|0〉a|0〉bc|q〉12 + |1〉a|1〉bc|1 + q〉12). Then Alice
transmits qubits 1,2 to Bob and Charlie respectively. At
the destination, Bob performs one single CNOT gate Cb1
and measures the qubit 1 to obtain the sending bit, and
Charlie performs CNOT gate Cc2 and measures the qubit
2. At the end of every round, Alice, Bob and Charlie act
the local operations of Hadamard gates on their carries
respectively to transform |G〉 and |E〉 into each other,
namely the appropriate one for the next round. Eve’s
presence can be detected by publicly comparing a subse-
quence of bits sent by Alice with those received by Bob
and Charlie after the data bits are measured.
For convenience, we use the same notations as in
Ref.[1].
In the beginning, corresponding to the data bits
q1, q2, q3, ..., qn that Alice wants to distribute to
Bob and Charlie, Bob prepares two variable strings
d1, d2, d3, ..., dn and e1, e2, e3, ..., en, which are used to
record the eavesdropping bits and the announcing bits
respectively. For convenience, let the cheat start the sec-
ond round.
The whole cheat strategy consists of splitting entan-
glement, maintaining the split entanglement, resending
bit, and intercepting bit.
1.The operation of splitting entanglement
The entanglement split occurs in the second round.
Bob intercepts the sending qubit 2, performs a unitary
operation U on particles b, 1 and 2, and discards parti-
cle 2, where U |000〉 = |000〉, U |001〉 = |110〉, U |010〉 =
|111〉, U |011〉 = |001〉, U |100〉 = |100〉, U |101〉 = |010〉,
U |110〉 = |011〉, and U |111〉 = |101〉. The analysis is as
following.
Alice encodes her one bit into qubits 1,2 to produce
the state
|Ψ0abc12〉 =
1
2
√
2
(|00000〉+ |00011〉+ |01100〉+ |01111〉
+|10101〉+ |10110〉+ |11001〉+ |11010〉) (q2 = 0),
or |Ψ1abc12〉 =
1
2
√
2
(|00001〉+ |00010〉+ |01101〉+ |01110〉
+|10100〉+ |10111〉+ |11000〉+ |11011〉) (q2 = 1).(1)
Here we use superscripts 0 and 1 to denote the states
corresponding to q2 = 0 and q2 = 1, respectively. This
notation also applies to the following equations and we
will, for simplicity, suppress the word “or” later.
After Bob performing the unitary operation U on par-
2ticles b, 1 and 2, the state will be converted into
|Θ0abc12〉 =
1
2
√
2
(|00000〉+ |00001〉+ |01100〉+ |01101〉
+|11110〉+ |11111〉+ |10010〉+ |10011〉),
|Θ1abc12〉 =
1
2
√
2
(|01010〉+ |01011〉+ |00110〉+ |00111〉
+|10100〉+ |10101〉+ |11000〉+ |11001〉),(2)
namely
|Θ0a1bc2〉 = (1/
√
2)(|00〉+ |11〉)a1 ⊗ (1/
√
2)(|00〉+ |11〉)bc
⊗(1/
√
2)(|0〉+ |1〉)2,
|Θ1a1bc2〉 = (1/
√
2)(|01〉+ |10〉)a1 ⊗ (1/
√
2)(|01〉+ |10〉)bc
⊗(1/
√
2)(|0〉+ |1〉)2.(3)
The entanglement split occurs. The pair of qubit a and
qubit 1 is the EPR pair between Alice and Bob. The pair
of qubit b and qubit c is the EPR pair between Bob and
Charlie. The carriers become two EPR pairs instead of
the initial GHZ state.
This qubit 1 in the second round is one part of the
carries in the sequel, but the qubit 1 in another round
will be measured by Bob. For distinction, we regards this
qubit 1 as qubit b, which is always in Bob’s site in the
sequel.
2.The operation of maintaining the split entanglement
In every round, after an encoding operation and the
corresponding decoding operation are finished by Alice
and Bob, or by Bob and Charlie, the carries of two EPR
states will be restored. The analysis is in the operation
of resending bit and the operation of intercepting bit.
According to the BK protocol in Ref.[1], Alice and
Charlie perform two Hardamard gates on their qubits a
and c respectively at the end of every round. To maintain
the split entanglement, Bob performs the same actions on
qubits b and b respectively. We write the evolvement by
Ha ⊗Hb ⊗Hb ⊗Hc
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)
ab
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)bc
=
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)
ab
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)bc,
Ha ⊗Hb ⊗Hb ⊗Hc
1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)
ab
⊗ 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)bc
=
1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)
ab
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)bc,
Ha ⊗Hb ⊗Hb ⊗Hc
1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)
ab
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)bc
=
1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)
ab
⊗ 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)bc.(4)
As a result, if q2 = 0 the carriers will be
(1/
√
2)(|00〉 + |11〉)ab ⊗ (1/
√
2)(|00〉 + |11〉)bc in every
round, whereas if q2 = 1 the carriers will be (1/
√
2)(|00〉−
|11〉)
ab
⊗ (1/√2)(|00〉 − |11〉)bc in every odd round but
(1/
√
2)(|01〉+|10〉)
ab
⊗(1/√2)(|01〉+|10〉)bc in every even
round.
3.The operation of resending bit
From the analysis above, In every round, Bob
and Charlie share one of three kinds of EPR car-
ries: (1/
√
2)(|00〉 + |11〉)bc, (1/
√
2)(|00〉 − |11〉)bc, and
(1/
√
2)(|01〉+ |10〉)bc.
To resend a bit ψ, Bob prepares one counterfeit particle
in the state |ψ〉 as qubit 2. Bob entangles the state |ψ〉2
to the carriers by performing one CNOT gate Cb2 on
(1/
√
2)(|00〉+ |11〉)bc|ψ〉2,
(1/
√
2)(|00〉 − |11〉)bc|ψ〉2,
(1/
√
2)(|01〉+ |10〉)bc|ψ〉2 (5)
to produce the state
(1/
√
2)(|0, 0, ψ〉+ |1, 1, 1 + ψ〉)bc2,
(1/
√
2)(|0, 0, ψ〉 − |1, 1, 1 + ψ〉)bc2,
(1/
√
2)(|0, 1, ψ〉+ |1, 0, 1 + ψ〉)bc2. (6)
Then Bob transmits the counterfeit qubit to Charlie.
At the destination, according to the BK protocol in
Ref.[1], Charlie acts on this state by the operator Cc2 to
produce the state
(1/
√
2)(|00〉+ |11〉)bc|ψ〉2,
(1/
√
2)(|00〉 − |11〉)bc|ψ〉2,
(1/
√
2)(|01〉+ |10〉)bc|1 + ψ〉2. (7)
Charlie measures the counterfeit particle to extract the
transmission bit. The bit sent by Bob and that received
by Charlie are same when Bob and Charlie share the
carriers (1/
√
2)(|00〉±|11〉)bc, but inverse when they share
(1/
√
2)(|01〉+ |10〉)bc.
In the second round, after the operation of splitting
entanglement, Bob discards qubit 2, then records e2 = 0,
d2 = 0 and ψ = 0. Bob resends the bit ψ to Charlie. At
the destination, Charlie receives the bit 0 when q2 = 0,
but the bit 1 when q2 = 1.
4.The operation of intercepting bit and the analysis of
the cheat strategy
Firstly, consider the intercept-resend in every odd
round (round 2m+ 1, 3 ≤ 2m+ 1 ≤ n).
According to the BK protocol in Ref.[1], after Alice’s
operations Ca1Ca2, the whole state will be converted into
(1/
√
2)(|00〉
ab
|q, q〉1,2 + |11〉ab|1 + q, 1 + q〉1,2)
⊗(1/
√
2)(|00〉+ |11〉)bc (q2 = 0),
(1/
√
2)(|00〉
ab
|q, q〉1,2 − |11〉ab|1 + q, 1 + q〉1,2)
⊗(1/
√
2)(|00〉 − |11〉)bc (q2 = 1). (8)
After receiving qubit 1 and intercepting qubit 2, Bob
performs CNOT gates C
b1
C
b2
on qubits b,1 and 2 to
3produce the state
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)
ab
⊗ |q, q〉1,2 ⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)bc (q2 = 0),
1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)
ab
⊗ |q, q〉1,2 ⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)bc (q2 = 1).(9)
Then he measures qubits 1,2 in the basis {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉,
|11〉}. He gains the measurement outcome |q, q〉12 that
denotes bit q. The bit sent by Alice and that received by
Bob are always same.
Bob records d2m+1 = q, e2m+1 = q, and ψ = q. By
the operation of resending bit, Bob sends bit ψ to Char-
lie with the help of the carriers (1/
√
2)(|00〉+ |11〉)bc or
(1/
√
2)(|00〉 − |11〉)bc.
From the above analysis, we can see that be-
cause Alice, Bob, and Charlie share the carriers
(1/
√
2)(|00〉+ |11〉)
ab
⊗ (1/√2)(|00〉+ |11〉)bc or the car-
riers (1/
√
2)(|00〉 − |11〉)
ab
⊗ (1/√2)(|00〉 − |11〉)bc, they
possess the same bits, which makes Bob avoid detection.
Secondly, consider the intercept-resend in every even
round (round 2m, 4 ≤ 2m ≤ n).
According to the BK protocol in Ref.[1], after Alice’s
operation Ca1, the whole state will be converted into
(1/
√
2)(|00〉
ab
|q〉1,2 + |11〉ab|1 + q〉1,2)⊗
(1/
√
2)(|00〉+ |11〉)bc (q2 = 0),
(1/
√
2)(|01〉
ab
|q〉1,2 + |10〉ab|1 + q〉1,2)⊗
(1/
√
2)(|01〉+ |10〉)bc (q2 = 1) (10)
After receiving qubit 1 and intercepting qubit 2, Bob
performs one single CNOT gate Cb1 on qubits b and 1 to
produce the state
(1/
√
2)(|00〉+ |11〉)
ab
⊗ |q〉1,2
⊗(1/
√
2)(|00〉+ |11〉)bc (q2 = 0),
(1/
√
2)(|01〉+ |10〉)
ab
⊗ |1 + q〉1,2
⊗(1/
√
2)(|01〉+ |10〉)bc (q2 = 1). (11)
Then he measures qubits 1,2 in the Bell basis {|0〉12,
|1〉12, (1/
√
2)(|00〉 − |11〉)12, (1/
√
2)(|01〉 − |10〉)12}. He
can gain one of two kinds of measurement outcomes |0〉12
and |1〉12, which denote bit 0 and bit 1 respectively. The
bit sent by Alice and that received by Bob are same when
Alice and Bob share the carriers (1/
√
2)(|00〉 + |11〉)bc,
but inverse when they share (1/
√
2)(|01〉+ |10〉)bc.
After Bob has intercepted bit 0, he records d2m = 0,
and then records e2m = 0, ψ = 0 or e2m = 1, ψ = 1
randomly, but after Bob has intercepted bit 1, he records
d2m = 1, and then records e2m = 0, ψ = 1 or e2m =
1, ψ = 0 randomly. The message of bit d2m is split into
bit e2m and bit ψ. By the operation of resending bit,
Bob sends bit ψ to Charlie with the help of the carriers
(1/
√
2(|00〉+ |11〉)bc or (1/
√
2)(|01〉+ |10〉)bc.
From the above analysis, we can see that when Al-
ice, Bob, and Charlie share the carriers of (1/
√
2)(|00〉+
|11〉)
ab
⊗ (1/√2)(|00〉+ |11〉)bc, Alice’s bit q2m and Bob’s
bit d2m are identical, and Bob’s bit ψ and Charlie’s bit
are also identical. The sum of Alice’s bit q2m, Bob’s bit
e2m and Charlie’s bit is zero modulo 2, which makes Bob
avoid detection.
From the above analysis, we can also see that when Al-
ice, Bob, and Charlie share the carriers of (1/
√
2)(|01〉+
|10〉)
ab
⊗ (1/√2)(|01〉+ |10〉)bc, Alice’s bit q2m and Bob’s
bit d2m are inverse, and Bob’s bit ψ and Charlie’s bit
are also inverse. Two inverse operations make the sum
of Alice’s bit q2m, Bob’s bit e2m and Charlie’s bit be zero
modulo 2, which makes Bob avoid detection.
It seems that the above cheat result cannot work en-
tirely because there are still two possibilities of Bob’s
eavesdropping bit string {dm, 1 ≤ m ≤ n}. However,
according to the BK protocol in Ref.[1], the three le-
gal parties have to compare a subsequence of the data
bits publicly to detect eavesdropping. Bob announces the
subsequence of the bit string {em, 1 ≤ m ≤ n} publicly.
Alice’s bits or Charlie’s bits will be leaked to Bob. More
specifically, as long as any even numbered data bit except
the second bit is announced, Bob can determine which
kind of the two possible carriers was used and whether or
not to flip the bits d2m(4 ≤ 2m ≤ n). If the public bits
include the second bit, only the second bit leads to error
with probability 1/2, which can be hidden in quantum
noise. Otherwise, in term of the kind of the carriers, Bob
can know the bit q2 precisely. By this means Bob can
obtain all the secret bits except for the little-probability
event that all the compared bits are odd numbered plus
2 numbered.
In conclusion, we have presented a cheat strategy that
allows Bob to gain all the secret bits before sharing, while
introducing one data bit error at most in the whole com-
munication, which makes the cheater avoid the detection
by the communication parities. Consequently this proto-
col cannot resist this type of attack.
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